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The Future of Legal Education for Practical Skills: 
Can the Innovations Survive? 
Charles D. Kelso* and M. Jane KeLso** 
Donald W. Jackson and E. Gordon Gee have distinguished 
themselves with yet another empirically oriented study of legal 
educati0n.l This time, however, Gee and Jackson eschew mere 
description. To improve the quality of debate on the future of 
American legal education, they invite us to consider several in- 
triguing hypotheses. Their review of the history of legal education 
in both America and England, their firsthand observation of pres- 
ent English legal education methods, and their evaluation of cur- 
rent data generated by interviews and questionnaires a t  ten 
American law schools lead them to suggest the following hy- 
potheses: 
(1) Large scale change in legal education is unlikely in the 
short run and exceedingly difficult to implement, maintain, and 
disseminate in the long run. 
(2) Factors associated with the persistence of an innovation 
are (a) ability to convey essential ideas and skills in "at least a 
minimally acceptable" manner, (b) lower cost than alternatives, 
(c) ease of administration and application, and (d) consistency 
with the overall structure and system of the institution, including 
the faculty reward and incentive structure. 
(3) Factors associated with the decline of an innovation are 
(a) great cost (especially if the cost is visible), (b) need for high 
levels of time and energy commitment, (c) need for substantial 
institutional adaptation for both implementation and integration 
with the totality of the law school curriculum, and (d) inconsis- 
tency with the extant system of rewards and incentives. 
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. A.B., J.D., The 
University of Chicago; LL.M., Columbia University; LL.D., John Marshall University; 
J.S.D., Columbia University. Professor Kelso is currently Editor of Learning and the Law. 
** A.B., University of Illinois; J.D., Indiana University. Mrs. Kelso is currently a 
Law Lecturer at Indiana-Purdue University-Indianapolis and Associate Director of the 
Interschool PLAT0 Program for Developing Lawyer Competencies. 
1. Gee and Jackson's first study provided details on the formally and informally 
required curricula in American law schools. E. GEE & D. JACKSON, FOLLOWING THE 
LEADER?: THE UNEXAMINED CONSENSUS IN LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA (1975). Their second 
study analyzed the number of course registrations in elective courses and related those 
courses to bar examination subjects. D. JACKSON & E. GEE, BREAD AND BUTTER?: ELECTIVES 
IN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1975). See Kelso, Book Review, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 597. 
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Illustrating how these hypotheses apply, Gee and Jackson 
point to the tension between the theoretical orientation usually 
found implicit in the case method (legal education's most suc- 
cessful innovation) and recurrent calls for a more practical orien- 
tation. Examples of such calls include the Chief Justice's Sonnett 
lecture,* the Clare  proposal^,^ formation of the Devitt Commit- 
tee,' and Arch Cantrall's articles of some years ago.5 Of course, 
the most highly visible point of tension is the continuing debate 
on clinical legal education. 
An application of the Gee and Jackson hypotheses suggests 
that the future of clinical legal education is in doubt because all 
of the factors associated with the decline of an innovation are 
present. Although substantial financial assistance from the 
Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility 
(CLEPR) has allowed most law schools to now offer some form 
of clinical education, CLEPR's millions are coming to an end at  
a time when the costs of clinical education are thought to be 
relatively great and highly visible. Effective clinical education 
not only requires an enormous expenditure of teacher time and 
energy, but also calls for teacher-student relationships quite for- 
eign to the usual classroom pattern. Clinical legal education is a 
recent innovation and represents a large scale change from tradi- 
tional legal education models. In addition, conventional tenure 
and promotion tracks are not well adapted to the career patterns 
of clinical teachers. 
Gee and Jackson suggest that clinical legal education would 
more likely continue its growth if efforts were made to alter the 
balance of factors that lead to decline or persistence. Thus, they 
advise tapping alternative sources of funding, reducing the load 
2. Adapted in Burger, Advocacy on Trial, LEARNING AND THE LAW, Spring 1974, a t  26. 
3. Discussion pro and con may be found in Pedrick & Frank, We Are Faced with a 
Clare and Present Danger, LEARNING AND THE LAW, Winter 1976, at 46; The Special Com- 
mittee on Admission to the Bar of the Association of American Law Schools, Confusing 
Incompetency with Inadequacy is a Big Mistake, LEARNING AND T H E  LAW, Summer 1976, 
at 41; Silverman, Ending the Myths that Plague the Clare Proposals, LEARNING AND THE 
LAW, Summer 1976, a t  22; The Open Door Policy on Trial: A Symposium, LEARNING AND 
THE LAW, Winter 1975, a t  46. 
4. The Committee to Consider Standards for Admission to Practice in Federal 
Courts, appointed by Chief Justice Burger, and under the chairmanship of Judge Edward 
J. Devitt, is considering how the quality of advocacy in the federal courts can best be 
improved. Devitt, Improving Federal Trial Advocacy, THE JUDGES' JOURNAL, Spring 1977, 
a t  40. 
5. Cantrall, Law Schools and the Layman: Is Legal Education Doing Its Job?, 38 
A.B.A.J. 907 (1952); Cantrall, Practical Skills Can and Must Be Taught in Law School, 6 
J .  LEGAL EDUC. 316 (1954). 
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of clinical teachers, and inventing teaching materials and tech- 
niques that would do for clinical teachers what the casebook did 
for classroom teachers. Finally, Gee and Jackson suggest that 
incentives for clinical teachers could be improved, perhaps by 
providing alternative tracks toward promotion and tenure. 
We find nothing here with which to disagree. We applaud 
Gee and Jackson's careful assemblage of factual data and their 
effort to mine it for evidence of trends, causal conditions, and 
projections. We believe that the context of legal education should 
be as broad as life itself and should include concern for the goals 
and consequences contingent on the exercise of our professional 
knowledge and skill. When the data is viewed from this perspec- 
tive, additional trend and causation hypotheses emerge that not 
only indicate who has been responsible for what, but also suggest 
several projections and alternative futures that Gee and Jackson 
have not discussed. Details follow as we pursue Gee and Jackson's 
goal of contributing to the debate on the future of American legal 
education. 
Gee and Jackson's review of historical and other data leads 
us to suggest four additional hypotheses: 
(1) The bar increasingly has become content not to have 
major responsibility for the initial education of future lawyers. 
During the past 100 years, legal education in university-related 
law schools has been substituted for education in proprietary or 
independent schools and for the apprenticeship of students to  
individual practicing lawyers. Retreating from direct responsibil- 
ity for legal education, the practicing bar appears content to rely 
on bar examinations to test the quality of an applicant's legal 
education. There is little indication that the practicing bar is 
currently prepared to assume the massive educational responsi- 
bility of training, for a substantial period of time, each year's 
wave of over 30,000 graduating law students. To the extent that 
practicing lawyers or judges wish to participate in law school 
education, they normally have ample opportunitites to teach on 
a part-time basis or in other ways to assist in law school programs 
of education and research. 
(2) Substantial innovation does not frequently originate 
within law schools and usually occurs only i f  it is supported by 
(or at least is not opposed by) external forces. Invention of the 
casebook method occurred when law schools were under no pres- 
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sure from bar admission authorities or accrediting agencies to use 
any other method. The anti-elitist philosophy of the Jacksonian 
era, beginning in the 1820's, had resulted in the destruction of 
almost all educational requirements for admission to the bar. By 
the 1870's, state laws no longer supported apprenticeship. Conse- 
quently, university-related schools could reasonably seek to at- 
tract good students by offering something different from either 
apprenticeships with practicing attorneys or lectures given in pro- 
prietary schools. Having succeeded in that endeavor, law school 
educators successfully locked Dean Langdell's vision into place 
through actions of the American Bar Association (ABA), the As- 
sociation of American Law Schools (AALS), and, later on, the 
admission authorities. Today, however, further innovation is not 
prompted by the bar examinations, the ABA's standards for ap- 
proval of law schools, or the AALS articles of membership. The 
climate for innovation is further tempered by the felt need to 
distribute research and development funds equally among all fac- 
ulty members or ranks, except to the extent that a faculty mem- 
ber by individual initiative is successful in attracting a grant. 
(3) Law schools have been quite malleable when external 
pressures, including grants, have impacted upon the length of  law 
school programs, the curriculum, the  composition of the faculty, 
admission requirements, and the size of a library. Gee and Jack- 
son's historical review shows the rapid movement of law schools 
to comply when external standards have been changed. For ex- 
ample, they note that when the ABA issued its first list of ap- 
proved schools in 1923, twenty-seven of the thirty-nine schools on 
the list had not been in compliance with the standards when they 
had been adopted only two years before. 
We suspect that law school pliability has increased in recent 
years as the governance of law schools has increasingly shifted 
from decanal authority to faculty meetings. Whereas deans once 
served in office under governance conditions and for a long 
enough period of time to build up expertise in relating to outside 
forces, today they typically serve for less than six years. Function- 
ally, today's deans closely resemble chairpersons of a faculty 
committee of the whole. Coming from the faculty and planning 
to return to careers in teaching and research, they will likely 
mirror whatever is the common denominator of the faculty. A 
desire for innovation is not likely to be that common denomina- 
tor, since faculty members usually accomodate their individual 
interests in teaching and research to whatever is necessary to 
maintain the school's accreditation and prestige. Because law 
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faculties normally lack collective expertise in dealing with out- 
side forces, and because i t  is now more difficult for deans to 
develop such leadership expertise, most law schools hesitate to 
take risks with innovations that are not encouraged by or compat- 
ible with external standards. 
(4) Law schools have affected the forces impinging on them 
from outside organizations only when at least a substantial num-  
ber of schools, including prestigious leaders, have been united 
behind a concept and have worked largely from inside the i n -  
pinging organizat ions-as by having professors and current or 
exdeans in  positions of influence in  the A B A  Section of Legal 
Education or the National Conference of Bar Examiners. 
The ABA Standards of 1921 are described by Gee and Jack- 
son as victories for schoolmen. It is not clear what developments 
since 1921 should be so regarded, other than perhaps the success- 
ful implementation of the 1921 policy decisions. With reference 
to practice skills education, Gee and Jackson have not presented 
any evidence indicating that clinical teachers are yet sufficiently 
organized, motivated, or well-placed to exert a substantial influ- 
ence on external sources. Nor are clinical teachers typically in a 
good position to be influential within their respective schools, 
since most are recent appointees to the faculty. 
There is, of course, a Section of Clinical Legal Education 
within the AALS. It has presented programs for annual meetings 
and has initiated a newsletter. Its most ambitious undertaking 
has been a national conference of clinical law teachers held a t  
Cleveland State University School of Law on October 20-22,1977. 
Supported by a grant from CLEPR, the conference focused on the 
theory and practice of clinical legal education as a means for 
teaching professional responsibility as well as practice skills. 
Nevertheless, whether clinical education is defined narrowly as 
programs in which students work directly with actual clients, or 
is considered more broadly to include problem and simulation 
approaches to the teaching of practice skills, it is not clear a t  this 
writing whether a foundation has been laid for bringing clinical 
teachers together in a coordinated program designed to work out 
a comprehensive theory for clinical legal education. 
When the above four hypotheses on trends and causal factors 
are added to those articulated by Gee and Jackson, what projec- 
tions can be made for practice skills education? I t  seems clear 
that the causal factor which today has the most potential for 
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insuring the future of practice skills education in the United 
States is the Joint ABA-AALS Committee for the Project on 
Guidelines for Clinical Programs in Law Schools. Chaired by 
Dean Robert B. McKay and supported by a grant from CLEPR, 
the committee is undertaking, under the direction of Professor 
Steven H. Leleiko, a two-year study of clinical legal education. 
Its charge includes the responsibility to develop guidelines for 
assessing the quality of clinical legal education programs. Such 
guidelines, particularly if found useful and workable by the 
ABA's Accreditation Committee in the context of actual accredi- 
tation visits, might well become part of the ABA standards for the 
Approval of Law Schools either through interpretation or amend- 
ment. Indeed, as a result of its study and/or subsequent experi- 
ence with guidelines, the Council might well recommend to the 
ABA House of Delegates that the ABA Standards be amended to 
require at  least some practice skills education for every law stu- 
dent. If this were to happen, there can be little doubt that the 
clinical field would be invigorated by a spate of scholarship simi- 
lar to that which followed the ABA Amendment of Standard 
402(a) mandating that some instruction in professional responsi- 
bility be required of every law student. At or about the time of 
that decision, and continuing today, scholarship has proliferated 
(as evidenced by the number of new coursebooks in the area), 
problem-method innovations have begun to appear, and a fine set 
of television tapes on ethical dilemmas has been made available 
by the ABA Consortium on Professional Education. 
Practice skills education could be locked into place-just as 
torts, contracts, and professional responsibility have been locked 
in-by a few words of text calling for law schools to require train- 
ing in such skills of all student candidates for a professional de- 
gree. A wide variety of educational experiences could provide this 
training, including, but not limited to, supervised work with ac- 
tual clients. 
We predict that such a requirement is not likely to be im- 
posed unless a coordinating arrangement is made with bar exam- 
ining authorities. The data Gee and Jackson collected in their 
earlier studies show that about 85% of all course registrations 
(required and elective) may be affected by impending bar exami- 
n a t i o n ~ . ~  Adding a practice skills requirement would further limit 
6. See  Kelso & Kelso, M u s t  Bar E x a m s  Distort Legal Education?, THE JUDGES' 
JOURNAL, Spring 1977, at 17; see also Kelso, supra note 1; Kelso, I n  the Shadow of the 
Bar Examiner, Can True Lawyering Be Taught?,  LEARNING AND THE LAW, Winter 1976, at 
38. 
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student electives and discourage curriculum diversity. However, 
if the bar examination authorities permitted candidates to take 
the bar exam sometime after the first year in law school, the 
situation would be different. The third year of law school, freed 
from the shadow of the bar examination, could sensibly include 
a practice skills requirement, and the ABA Committee might so 
recommend. We understand that the ABA, AALS, National Con- 
ference of Bar Examiners, Law School Admissions Council, and 
other organizations whose functions relate to legal education are 
planning a series of coordinating conferences. An action plan de- 
signed to coordinate practice skills education and the bar exam 
could well work its way onto the agenda. 
A coordinated move might bring into legal education new 
resources not otherwise available. For example, it might help 
induce the Ford Foundation to make an  additional grant to 
CLEPR, justify additional appropriations by Congress to the 
National Legal Services Corporation, and persuade the ABA to 
strengthen its Consortium for Professional Education so that its 
efforts focused on pre-admission-to-practice as well as on post- 
admission education. I t  would also give the law schools an addi- 
tional reason to call upon local practitioners and judges to con- 
tribute their services (or to work for a small honorarium) in the 
pursuit of clinical education, thus reestablishing the best part of 
the apprenticeship system. Further, i t  would give the law schools 
an additional budget justification in their dealings with parent 
universities. Finally, it might make the schools more responsive 
to opportunities for undertaking programs of education and ser- 
vice to state agencies willing to enter into contracts with law 
schools for such services. 
Another external development that could impact favorably 
on clinical and other forms of practice skills education would be 
the successful development and implementation of a national 
boards examination on practice skills. Dean Fred Hart of New 
Mexico, working within the framework of a law school consor- 
tium, is directing a project designed to create such tests. More 
than 100 law schools have given preliminary indications of inter- 
est in cooperating. The enterprise has been funded by a grant to 
CLEPR from the Fund for the Improvement of Post-secondary 
Education. Taking such a test (or test battery) may ultimately 
It is true, of course, that ABA Standard 306 permits 300 of the required 1200 residence 
and class hours to be satisfied by substituting something other than regularly scheduled 
class sections. However, law school decisionmaking is in the hands of classroom teachers 
rather than clinical teachers. 
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lead to a prestigious certificate or somehow become linked to the 
bar admission process. If so, it would have the kind of catalytic 
effect on practice skills education that national moot court and 
client counseling competitions have on the courses that develop 
those skills. 
Predicting the future is more complex with respect to an 
innovation from within the law schools that would do for clinical 
teachers what the casebook did for classroom teachers. Gee and 
Jackson point out that nothing in the history of legal education 
has had the impact of the casebook method. I t  was inexpensive 
to create and use; it combined theoretical and practical education 
(at least for roles involved in appeals) ; and, perhaps most impor- 
tantly, it involved teachers and students in an educationally re- 
warding interactive dialogue that could proceed either deduc- 
tively or inductively. It is not easy, however, to see how a closely 
comparable result can be achieved in teaching students how to 
deal with clients and function in nonadjudicative lawyer roles in 
office practice. 
Nevertheless, the future in this regard is less opaque if we 
make a sincere effort to free our imagination from the casebook 
analogy. First, let us not assume that all innovation must be the 
product of a lone scholar (or even coauthors working at  several 
schools). In recent times, great innovations in technology have 
resulted from team efforts. If teams a t  or from several law schools 
tackled various jobs and competencies, as identified by a func- 
tional analysis, the necessary critical mass of energy and ideas 
might be developed to give birth to a powerful innovation. At the 
very least, the task of developing workable clinical education in- 
novations might be divided into an agreed set of fields or areas 
for individual work. 
In looking ahead to the possible parameters of practice skills 
innovation, we should not allow ourselves to think only in terms 
of printed material put between hard covers. Instead, we should 
think in terms of a total teaching environment and associated 
programs. Optimum development of practice skills may require 
an environment even more complex and interactive than a class- 
room, a teacher, and students who have read cases assembled in 
a coursebook. The teaching environment may have to resemble 
the real world of practice in many important respects.' 
- -- - -- - -- 
7. Thus, there may be a need for one or more schools to maintain a television staff 
and, perhaps, a staff associated with a national or regional network of computer-based 
instruction. Perhaps there will be an interface between this technology and others, such 
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Ideally, a facility specially designed for practice skills educa- 
tion should serve as the laboratory for clinical learning and exper- 
imentation, the library of current events, and the nerve center of 
teacher-student-client interaction. Separate housing, specialized 
equipment, and a trained staff would greatly facilitate the precise 
observing and recording of lawyering activity in all of its manifes- 
tations, as well as provide effective and efficient educational feed- 
back to students from such observations. The building should 
also have the facilities and staff for obtaining up-to-date informa- 
tion on the developing factual context in which cases arise and 
are handled in the courts or otherwise. There should be system- 
atic followup on cases to evaluate the lawyering, the legal pro- 
cesses, and the development of the law. Further, the staff should 
be collecting and processing political and socioeconomic informa- 
tion about the larger context of local, state, national, and interna- 
tional communities in which law is but one of many forces. Most 
importantly, the building should house personnel who would sub- 
ject that information to the full range of "policy science" pro- 
cesses explicated by Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal. This 
policy science is a professional decisionmaking process character- 
ized by clarifying goals, discovering trends and causal conditions, 
making projections, and choosing and pursuing alternatives in 
light of what is most likely to produce preferred outcomes with 
an optimum expenditure of time and other  resource^.^ 
Cooperative innovation of this magnitude will more likely 
come into being if the accrediting authorities reconsider certain 
standards or criteria for membership. If innovation in clinical 
education requires teamwork by different kinds of specialists, 
working perhaps at different schools, or calls for a substantial 
amount of instrumentation or facility redesign, resources will 
have to be withheld or shifted away from conventional areas such 
as enlarging the library and increasing the number of full-time 
as LEXIS, WESTLAW, and automatic typing machines, so that up-to-date teaching 
materials could be distributed instantly and duplicated a t  each law school (rather than 
printed a t  a central location and mailed to bookstores). 
8. Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training 
in  the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943). 
If the facility's programs encompassed a constituency more inclusive than the school's 
students, new resources might be brought into the school. For example, the school might 
educate the public on how law helps preserve individual liberty and increase the civil 
domain in which people reasonably are free from all forms of coercion. The public may 
learn that the law also seeks to ensure equality of opportunity, encourage the maximum 
production and sharing of all values, and preserve a t  least a minimal level of subsistence 
for all persons. 
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faculty. Given the limitations on current budgets and the trend 
of faculty input on law school decisions, present accrediting stan- 
dards exert a powerful restraining influence on any such realloca- 
tion of resources. Thus, the following amendments to ABA Stan- 
dards might improve the climate for innovation in the law 
schools. 
First, under the heading "Faculty" the ABA might consider 
creating a new Standard 402(c) which would provide: 
Law schools may substitute in place of a reasonable number of 
additional full-time faculty members specialists in educational 
technology, clinicians, staff members, or technology where the 
effect of such substitution on the school's educational program 
is the equivalent of adding an additional faculty member. 
Again, ABA Standards with respect to the law library are, 
quite arguably, forcing each law school to collect a great deal of 
material that is or could be readily available through other means 
and to develop a staff of professionals whose expertise is solely in 
the handling of a conventional library. LEXIS, WESTLAW, and 
other systems of electronic storage and retrieval of legal text will 
surely substitute for a great many bound volumes in years not too 
far ahead. To pave the way for this change, ABA Standard 603(h) 
might well be amended to provide: 
To the extent that a law library can make the text of legal 
material readily available by computerized research or other- 
wise, such technology may be used in substitution for publica- 
tions in conventional bound form. 
The development of innovations in clinical legal education 
necessarily involves an evaluation of the competing values that 
form the underpinnings of the debate between theoretical and 
practical orientations toward learning. For guidance on values to 
use in assessing legal education and charting its future, we should 
heed some wise people. We turn first to Dean Robert B. McKay, 
who recently wrote: 
Without question legal education in the United States has met 
the test of technical proficiency. The law faculties are superb; 
the law students are at  least as good; the libraries are generally 
excellent and the structures that house the law schools are often 
magnificent. In all these respects the law schools are stronger 
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than ever before and better than their counterparts in any other 
part of the world.g 
Despite this favorable overall judgment on technical profi- 
ciency, Dean McKay also expressed disappointment that certain 
opportunities have been missed. He said that the law schools 
have remained almost exclusively professional in tone, rejecting 
repeated attempts for infusion of other social sciences and the 
humanities (even as background for understanding the context of 
legal issues). He admitted that almost all law schools now offer 
clinical courses in which law students represent actual clients 
under faculty supervision. However, he also said: 
The proud claim to professionalism has been more facade than 
solid structure. If the interest in professional training had been 
the sole motivating force, we should long ago have required clin- 
ical training of all law students or at  least have continued the 
apprentice programs that were long ago abandoned in nearly all 
jurisdictions. lo 
In this and other ways, according to Dean McKay, the law 
schools have not done as much as they should have done in lead- 
ing the profession toward higher levels of professional ethics and 
responsibility. In his opinion 
[llaw schools should be justice schools in which law students 
are taught not only the need for faithful advocacy of their 
clients' causes, but also their professional obligation to improve 
the system for the delivery of justice; where law students are 
taught the obligation (and the excitement) of representing the 
poor and middle-income groups as well as the rich; and where 
professional responsibility is the most, not the least important 
matter to be taught." 
Assuming Dean McKay's goals are generally accepted, how 
can they best be accomplished? A classic debate on the subject 
by two law school greats occurred in 1949. Professor Lon Fuller 
argued that law school education should immerse students in the 
processes of adjudication and legislation.12 These processes 
should include what Professor Louis M. Brown would call 
9. McKay, Legal Education, in AMERICAN LAW: THE THIRD CENTURY 261-62 (1976) (a 
collection of lectures delivered at the Bicentennial celebration of the New York University 
School of Law). 
10. Id. at 263-64. 
11. McKay, A Plague o f  Simplistic Assumptions, LEARNING AND THE LAW, Summer 
1977, at 11, 15. 
12. Fuller, W h a t  the Law Schools Can Contribute to the Making of Lawyers, 1 J .  
LEGAL EDUC. 189 (1948). 
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"preventive law" for clients, and focus particular attention on 
issues of professional responsibility as they arise.13 Necessary law- 
yer skills would emerge as a welcome byproduct of this concentra- 
tion of attention. Professor Karl Llewellyn, disagreeing, urged 
instead that law schools focus on training students for "the law 
jobs" by emphasizing instruction in the various functional tasks 
of lawyers, particularly spokesmanship.14 This exchange of views 
mirrors the tension between practical and theoretical emphasis 
that Gee and Jackson found pervasive in the history and current 
debate of American legal education. If the decline or persistence 
of innovation is fully and accurately described by Gee and Jack- 
son's hypotheses and the four hypotheses we have drawn from 
their data, then Fuller seems destined to win. His view is more 
compatible with the casebook method, while some, but not all, 
of Llewellyn's goals can be accomplished with cases and prob- 
lems. 
It seems that the best way to pursue the McKay goals and 
to escape from the horns of the Fuller-Llewelyn dilemma is t o  
view desired consequences in terms of a sufficiently high level of 
process and values. This will lead to concentration on developing 
sufficiently comprehensive models of processes for the making, 
implementing, and reviewing of decisions. Therefore, our preced- 
ing four hypotheses, when combined with the Gee and Jackson 
principles on the decline and persistence of innovation, suggest a 
fifth factual hypothesis that might resolve the apparently hope- 
less dilemma posed for practice skills education, particularly clin- 
ical education: 
When able people i n  legal education visualize a desirable 
goal with sufficient clarity, they find the way to combine and 
focus their energies to  bring about innovation and to e f fect  the 
institutional changes, internal and external, necessary to insure 
its survival. 
According to the above hypothesis, the major prerequisite t o  
innovation is visualizing with sufficient clarity a desirable goal, 
such as providing the optimum education for future lawyers. 
Writing in 1943, Professor McDougal identified one area of train- 
ing indispensable to the optimum legal education when he as- 
13. See L. BROWN & E. DAUER, PERSPECTIVES ON THE LAWYER AS PLANNER (1978); New 
Ways to Teach Lawyering: A Symposium, LEARNING AND THE LAW, Summer 1974, at 8, 
69-71; Brown & Brown, What Counsels the Counselor? The  Code of Professionul Responsi- 
bility's Ethical Considerations-A Preventative Law Analysis, 10 VAL. L. REV. 453 (1976). 
14. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis i n  Legal Education, 1 J .  LEGAL EDUC. 211 (1948). 
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serted that "[nlone who deal with the law, however defined, can 
escape policy when policy is defined as the making of important 
decisions which affect the distribution of values."15 In a recent 
address to the Law School Admission Council, he further ex- 
plained why policymaking is the fundamental role of attorneys in 
today's society and invited legal educators to identify the more 
specific lawyering roles and skills required for their performance: 
The position that Professor Lasswell and I took many years ago 
was that while all law is policy, not all policy is law. All law, in 
the sense that it affects a distribution of values among people 
in a community, is policy; some policy is, however, naked power. 
Whether we like it or not, law schools, lawyers, government 
officials, all of us, are working with values all the time. The only 
question is how consciously, how deliberately, and how system- 
atically we formulate and clarify these values. 
President Levi [later Attorney General Levi] indicated 
very aptly when he remarked that the legal profession has al- 
ways had a high concern for our great inheritance of the Western 
European values of human dignity. . . . 
In your more detailed clarification of the basic community 
policies you serve, you need to become more precise about the 
goals for which you choose and train lawyers. One common con- 
ception of a profession is that it is a group that has not only a 
special skill but also a responsible concern for the goals and 
aggregate consequences of the exercise of this skill. 
From this perspective, the social role of the lawyer is that 
of the specialist on authority and control who has a responsible 
concern for the common interests of all the communities of 
which he is a member. The function of the lawyer is to assist in 
the establishment and maintenance of the totality of a com- 
munity's public order-to reduce the number of decisions taken 
by mere naked power, to manage authority and control in a way 
that will maximize the production and sharing of all values, and 
to increase the civic domain in which people are free from all 
forms of coercion. 
In the performance of this general role, the lawyer must 
obviously engage in many more specific roles or tasks. Your first 
task is to identify these more specific roles and tasks and the 
capabilities and skills required for their performance. It should 
scarcely require saying that your every effort should be to en- 
courage pluralism and experimentation.16 
15. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 8, at 207 (emphasis in original). 
16. McDougal, Beware the Squid Function, LEARNING AND THE LAW, Spring 1974, at 
16, 17-18. 
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It seems to us that the faculty members in the best position 
to observe lawyers' roles and tasks, and the capabilities and skills 
required for their performance, are those associated with clinical 
programs or with other programs or courses in which practical 
skills are directly taught. The challenge for developing the future 
of legal education has clearly been cast bf~rofessor McDougal 
in a way that puts it squarely into the "ball park" of practical 
skills teachers. Having been trained by the case method, and 
usually having further developed their skills through actual prac- 
tice experience, practice skills teachers are cast in the role of 
professional observers and teachers in situations calling for prac- 
tical wisdom. These faculty members should therefore be the 
front line of research on what constitutes a legal professional, how 
well the profession is fulfilling its responsibilities, and what kind 
of future professionals can help the profession as a whole compe- 
tently provide a broad range of lawyering services. 
We cannot suppose that the necessary concepts of effective 
clinical training will emerge if lawyering or social processes are 
viewed from a low level of abstraction. Little is likely to develop 
if practical skills education is viewed solely as the processing of 
cases, e.g., interviewing poverty clients and serving their needs 
through the use of law students and law school resources. Nor is 
it  useful to think only in terms of combining specific skills such 
as direct and cross-examination. Rather, the faculty and students 
must view the process as a unique window on the world that 
allows them to observe, record, process, critique, reassemble, and 
present back to students, the profession, and the world an accu- 
rate picture of what goes on when lawyers effectively reach deci- 
sions in support of responsible value choices. The goal is to build 
ever better models of the processes involved in making, imple- 
menting, and reviewing responsible policy, strategy, and tactical 
choices on behalf of clients or broader constituencies. 
A review of the clinical decisionmaking process utilized by 
doctors provides some useful clues as to how one might start a t  a 
sufficiently general level. When effective medical clinicians are 
faced with a case, they generate alternative hypotheses in light 
of the facts initially presented and, using their knowledge of basic 
science, gather additional facts to subject those hypotheses to 
confirming and disconfirming tests. The most effective clinicians 
structure their diagnostic problems and their search for facts so 
that proof of one hypothesis tends to disprove another." We law- 
- 
17. Kelso, In Quest of a Theory for Lawyering: Some Hypotheses and a Tribute to 
Dean Soh Mentschikoff, 29 U .  MIAMI L.REV. 159, 168-76 (1975). 
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yers also do that at  each stage of our decisionmaking cycles. With 
respect to arriving a t  a basic choice of alternatives to implement 
a policy, strategy, or tactical decision, our decisionmaking cycles 
in each of our roles seem to involve the following tasks that have 
been isolated by McDougal and Lasswell:18 
(1) Clarify goals: What is i t  that we (andlor our clients or 
other constituencies or communities) seek to accomplish? 
(2) Determine trends: What is the degree to which these 
preferred events have been realized to date? 
(3) Determine causal conditions: What factors account for 
the direction and intensity of change; does the explanation con- 
sist of a single factor or of multiple or (typically) interacting 
factors? 
(4) Make projections: What is likely to happen regardless of 
my preferences? 
(5) Consider alternatives: What alternatives will increase the 
probability that preferred events will most economically occur? 
To classify problem types and goal implementation in light 
of these decisionmaking tasks, we would suggest a slightly more 
elaborate scheme than did Professor Fuller. One can begin, as he 
did, with adjudication, defining the task more broadly than liti- 
gation to include any processes in which decisions are based upon 
proof of facts and upon arguments as to the interpretation and 
application of rules. We can then add legislation, as he did, again 
defining it very broadly to include the creation of rules to express 
an accomodation of interests for governing situations or situation 
types (whether the creation be done by a legislature or by a client 
via a will or some collective manifestation of intention such as a 
contract). We would elaborate on this analysis by breaking nego- 
tiation out of legislation. Negotiation may lead to the creation of 
rules, as in a settlement agreement or a forward-looking contract; 
it may, however, also lead to agreements that merely set up pro- 
cesses.19 The focus of attention in negotiating is on creating a 
shared reality, i.e., future behavior. Developing rules to govern 
- - - 
18. See Laswell & McDougal, supra note 8. 
19. Professor Fuller asks: 
What is a contract? For the lawyer concerned with the adjudicative process a 
contract is a legally enforceable agreement, and its meaning is that which a 
court will give to it in the event of litigation. For the lawyer bringing a contract 
into existence it may be primarily a framework for cooperative effort, which 
performs its function without regard to its enforceability or the interpretations 
a judge would give to it. 
Fuller, supra note 12, at 195. 
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future behavior is merely one means for creating contingencies 
that help increase the probability of certain future behavior. 
We would double back to argue that clarifying goals and 
evaluating alternatives as part of advising or counseling persons 
is as much a lawyer task as are litigation, legislation, and negotia- 
tion. It may also be useful to isolate and focus upon two other 
areas: spokesmanship other than advocacy, and the recruitment, 
selection, and training of personnel. Gathering facts, including 
information on what a client or a constituency really wants or 
needs, and predicting or evaluating the decisions of others are 
probably competencies involved in tasks rather than tasks which 
themselves directly serve to implement goals.1° 
In traditional law classes, and even in practice skills courses, 
law teachers tend to concentrate so much on the making and the 
implementing of decisions that we usually do not consider the 
evaluation or assessment of our own decisions as one of our basic 
professional tasks. We evaluate judicial decisions, to be sure, but 
typically as a means to better understand how or why the court 
reached its decision or to argue that the court should have 
reached a different decision or relied on different reasons. It is not 
yet a standard part of our self-image as professionals to conduct 
our practice in a relatively self-conscious way, subjecting our own 
work and that of fellow lawyers to evaluative scrutiny in order to 
improve its quality. In fact, when we are dealing with people we 
typically begin to implement decisions in a tentative way, observ- 
ing the reaction of persons we are seeking to persuade or from 
whom we are seeking to learn. If our first tactic doesn't appear 
to be working, we alter our initial approach. If that doesn't work, 
or the results appear entirely discouraging, we may review our 
entire strategy. We may even cycle back to review our basic goal 
preferences (our policy decisions) and talk them over with our- 
selves, our colleagues, or our clients. It is to be expected that 
practice skills teachers will perfect ways for giving feedback to 
students from their clinical performances that will enhance sensi- 
tivity to the evaluative aspect of professional problem solving. 
Hopefully, positive reverberations will appear at some future 
time in the way law is practiced and the way the profession is 
organized to sustain the quality of that practice. 
The list of lawyer tasks might be elaborated further, though 
we have no concrete proposals. Enough has been said to indicate 
- -- 
20. One useful analysis of lawyer competencies has been prepared by the 
Competency-Based Task Force of Antioch School of Law. 
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the kind of framework we would suggest to clinical and other 
practice skills teachers around which they might usefully organ- 
ize cooperative work to bring a sense of order to a field of instruc- 
tion whose future is primarily their responsibility. 
In sum, the means we recommend to achieve the goals ex- 
pressed generally by Dean McKay and more specifically by Pro- 
fessor McDougal is to devise an approach to legal education that 
more accurately reflects the realities of today's law practice and 
society than does a system which includes only the casebook 
method (or that method as supplemented by some problems and 
materials). Of course, the knowledge and skills acquired in case 
or problem method courses form an important part of the founda- 
tion for a professional education. I t  is for the clinician, however, 
to integrate this kind of knowledge and skill into a fully contex- 
tual approach to professional problem solving. 
To educate for this contextual approach to problem solving, 
we should clearly reject Dean Langdell's concept that three years 
of law study is best approached as a science leading to theoretical 
knowledge, a science whose materials are appellate cases and 
whose method is inducing principles from those cases. Instead, we 
should assert that  three years of education for a professional 
career in law is best approached as an attempt to develop profes- 
sional skill in making, implementing, and evaluating decisions in 
light of their full context. If this calls for science, i t  is "policy 
science." 
In summary, the basic problem is to discover how values and 
other kinds of reality intertwine in wise decisions made by law- 
yers in the various contexts that make up the set of roles and 
tasks comprising their professional lives. The problem is not easy. 
However, with the path blessed by Dean McKay, the trail 
marked by Fuller and Llewellyn, the nature of the walk spelled 
out by McDougal and Lasswell, and strikingly good innovations 
appearing here and there, surely our clinical and practical skills 
teachers can do a better job of getting together in this generation 
of enhanced communication and travel than did the realists of a 
generation ago. The only troubling uncertainty in this part of 
legal education's future is the subjective-objective question of 
whether today's practice skill teachers think well enough of them- 
selves and their goals and tasks to make the necessary investment 
of time and to take the risks inherent in any innovation. 
